In traditional Wireless Sensor network's (WSN's), the sink is the only unconditionally
trusted authority. If the sink is not connected to the nodes for a period of
time then the network is considered as unattended. In Unattended Wireless Sensor
Network (UWSN), a trusted mobile sink visits each node periodically to collect data.
This network differs from the traditional multi hop wireless sensor networks where
the nodes close to the sink deplete their power earlier than the other nodes. An
UWSN can prolong the life time of the network by saving the battery of the nodes
and also it can be deployed in environments where it is not practical for the sink to
be online all the time. Saving data in the memory of the nodes for a long time causes
security problems due to the lack of tamper-resistant hardware. Data collected by
the nodes has to be secured until the next visit of the sink. Securing the data from
an adversary in UWSN is a challenging task. We present two non-cryptographic algorithms
(DS-PADV and DS-RADV) to ensure data survivability in mobile UWSN.
The DS-PADV protects against proactive adversary which compromises nodes before
identifying its target. DS-RADV makes the network secure against reactive adversary
which compromises nodes after identifying the target. We also propose a data
authentication scheme against a mobile adversary trying to modify the data. The proposed
data authentication scheme uses inexpensive cryptographic primitives and few
message exchanges. The proposed solutions are analyzed both mathematically and
using simulations proving that the proposed solutions are better than the previous
ones in terms of security and communication overhead.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:OOU-OLD./23646 |
Date | 14 January 2013 |
Creators | Vepanjeri Lokanadha Reddy, Sasi Kiran |
Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thèse / Thesis |
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