Taiwan area has administered local autonomy for over fifty years. At first its authority was mainly based on an administrative order called the Guidelines for Local Autonomy and then the Local System Law at present. Among the powers vested by the law, veto is an important weapon for the local administration to balance legislative power. However, the veto power has yet to be further elaborated for it was used in just a little more than 500 cases all over Taiwan area in the past sixty years.
This essay tries to probe both the theoretical and practical facets of the veto system. The local system of this country adopted an administration and legislature separation system. In case a conflict should occur between the two powers, its time for veto to help solve the dilemma. As a matter of fact, government is responsible for proposing important bills, the officials can defend its policies while attending the legislature for interpellation or proposal deliberation. In addition, budgets are only proposed by local administrations. Local legislatures are restrained from increasing the sizes of the proposed budgets by law. So while deliberating on draft resolutions, the legislature would consider officials¡¦ opinions and not to make less feasible resolutions. Despite an unfeasible resolution should be made, the administration would rather seek other ways out than veto it in order to maintain the harmony between the two powers. More over, the content of the Local System Law has put more weight on administration power so as to make the legislature conservative in enforcing its power lest its resolutions should be vetoed.
In recent years, democracy has enrooted into the daily lives of the society; Local political environment change drastically and divided government is now a commonplace; Local cliques have either reformed or vanished; Gangsters and money politics enter local legislatures and struggle for personal interests. The administrations are facing an overwhelmingly new eco system in local legislatures. Comparing the factors that induce a veto, it is found that the conflict for personal interest is the most common cause.
The veto system is a mechanism of instrument equilibrium. Administration and legislation should stand on an equal position to discuss veto dispute to reach the purposes of the separation of powers between the executive and legislature. This essay suggests the central government that the time limit, quorum, scope and method in deliberating a veto should be explicitly defined in law so as to make sure a healthier veto system.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0615106-201155 |
| Date | 15 June 2006 |
| Creators | Luo, Ryh-chuen |
| Contributors | none, none, none |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0615106-201155 |
| Rights | withheld, Copyright information available at source archive |
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