In our setting, verification is a process that checks whether a device's program (implementation) has been produced according to its corresponding requirements specification. Ideally a client builds the requirements specification of a program and asks a developer to produce the actual program according to the requirements specification it provides. After the program is built, a verifier is asked to verify the program. However, nowadays verification methods usually require good knowledge of the program to be verified and thus sensitive information about the program itself can be easily leaked during the process.
In this thesis, we come up with the notion of secure and trusted verification which allows the developer to hide non-disclosed information about the program from the verifier during the verification process and a third party to check the correctness of the verification result. Moreover, we formally study the mutual trust between the verifier and the developer and define the above notion in the context of both an honest and a malicious developer.
Besides, we implement the notion above both in the setting of an honest and a malicious developer using cryptographic primitives and tabular expressions. Our construction allows the developer to hide the modules of a program and the verifier to do some-what white box verification. The security properties of the implementation are also formally discussed and strong security results are proved to be achieved. / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/17468 |
| Date | 06 1900 |
| Creators | Cai, Yixian |
| Contributors | Karakostas, George, Wassyng, Alan, Computing and Software |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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