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Essays on regulation policy, wildlife quality, and excess demand

<p> The second chapter examines how both domestic and foreign tobacco regulations affect the flow of tobacco trade. I develop a gravity equation incorporating a comprehensive set of domestic and foreign tobacco regulations into a country's tobacco import demand and estimate their bilateral effects. The results suggest a country's tobacco imports are significantly affected by their trading partner's tobacco regulations. There are two important results: spatial regulations reduce tobacco trade regardless of trade direction and marketing regulations in importing countries may actually increase tobacco imports. These results highlight the importance of understand regulations in an increasingly multilateral economy. </p><p> The third chapter investigates the effects of varying levels of access and excludability on a common pool resource with intrinsic quality characteristics. I analyze the case of deer hunting on leased properties by hunting clubs and estimate the lease size elasticity of both harvest and antler quality. The results suggest lease size has a small but significant effect. For all clubs with smaller than average hunting leases, a simulated increase to the average size results in approximately a 4.5 percent increase in the average antler quality of deer harvested. Although I analyze properties leased by hunting clubs, the results are applicable to various other management scenarios. </p><p> The fourth chapter develops the relationship between excess demand and purchase options. I illustrate a mechanism allowing firms to smooth sales across periods with uncertain quality and increase expected profit over the market clearing strategy. By "underpricing" high quality goods and offering a purchase option guaranteeing a single price regardless of quality, firms create excess demand and increase consumer willingness to pay for their purchase option. The firm maximizes profit by choosing a guaranteed price low enough to create sufficient excess demand and consumer willingness to pay for the purchase option that markets clear when quality is low. Using a numeric example, I demonstrate a case where this behavior increases profit over the market clearing strategy.</p>

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:PROQUEST/oai:pqdtoai.proquest.com:3598102
Date28 November 2013
CreatorsOlanie, Aaron Z.
PublisherWashington State University
Source SetsProQuest.com
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typethesis

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