Return to search

FROM GUILT TO REGRET : The impact of neuroscientific evidence upon our ideas of libertarian free will and moral responsibility

In this essay I will investigate some different opinions about how or whether we should change our views concerning moral responsibility if neuroscience shows that contra-causal free will is implausible and also argue that holding people morally responsible is not the best method of making people act morally. A common approach is to argue that we can hold people responsible in a non-absolute sense and many argue that this has practical benefits (i.e. that people would act more morally). I evaluate different alternatives and conclude that there are different beliefs and opinions that cause disagreement in this question. I argue that moral responsibility is implausible without the existence of contra-causal free will (because it is then just a question of luck what actions you will perform) and that it is more practical to shift our focus to other ways of changing people and not blaming them.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:his-7175
Date January 2012
CreatorsHallin, Nathalie
PublisherHögskolan i Skövde, Institutionen för kommunikation och information
Source SetsDiVA Archive at Upsalla University
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeStudent thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text
Formatapplication/pdf
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Page generated in 0.0014 seconds