Concept of Two-level games is one of the most sophisticated approach for analysis of the process of international bargaining. Moreover, many research papers focused either on prediction of the outcome of international negotiations or on explanation of the outcomes of former negotiations are based on premises of this concept. However, its application on real example of the negotiation, specifically, on the SALT I talks between the Soviet Union and the United States shows that the Two-level games is not universally valid since many of its predictions have not been verified. There are certain limitations within crucial independent variables (defined by the concept) connected with domestic institutions and domestic preferences and their influence on the size of win-set which has direct impact on the results of the bargaining process. These limitations must be considered in the research. The analysis of the SALT I explores that heterogeneous preferences as well as relatively strong domestic institutions do not have to result in smaller win-set; that presence of no-agreement costs can reduce an influence of other variables, and; that presence of those non-expected (from the view of the original concept) consequences caused by the adjustment of the independent variables occurs within the negotiations...
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:357463 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Ježek, Jiří |
| Contributors | Karlas, Jan, Parízek, Michal |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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