Reasons for action are considerations in the light of which we act. But just what is it that we attribute to a person when we credit her with a good reason? What sort of entity is on our minds when we deliberate about what we have reason to do? This book examines this question and evaluates a number of approaches to the philosophy of reasons, including normative realism, psychologism and Humeanism. The second half of the book contains the defense of a theory of reasons influenced by the writings of Wilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom. This theory is further developed in relation to a number of recent topics in action theory, including the Guise of the Good thesis, internalism and the normativity of reasons.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:MUENCHEN/oai:edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17723 |
| Date | 01 February 2013 |
| Creators | Esterhazy, Paulus |
| Publisher | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
| Source Sets | Digitale Hochschulschriften der LMU |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation, NonPeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Relation | http://edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17723/ |
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