Chapter IV examines the increasing level of British interest in the Yugoslav revolt. Inadequately informed, and under pressure from internal and external sources, the British government resolved during autumn 1941 to offer exclusive support to Mihailovic. This decision was taken despite the knowledge that fighting had broken out between the insurgent groups. Chapter V covers the first part of 1942. Despite a growing awareness of the Partisan contribution to the anti-Axis struggle, and of the existence of civil war within Yugoslavia, the British continued to offer their full moral support to Mihailovic, and to attempt to rally all Yugoslavs to him. Chapter VI shows how during the second half of 1942, due to growing doubts over Mihailovic's political objectives and military strategy, the British policy consensus gradually disintegrated. Consequently, the reaffirmation of British support for Mihailovic at the end of the year was little more than a facade. Finally, the conclusion illustrates how British expectations of Mihailovic were based on a fundamental misevaluation not only of the latter's capabilities, but also of the very nature of the Yugoslav resistance movements.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:303683 |
| Date | January 1991 |
| Creators | Trew, Simon |
| Publisher | Keele University |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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