The ‘Demarcation Problem’ is to mark the boundary between things that are scientific and things that are not. Philosophers have worked on this problem for a long time, and yet there is still no consensus solution. Should we continue to hope, or must we draw a more sceptical conclusion? In his paper, ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem’, Larry Laudan (1983) does the latter. In this thesis, I address the three arguments he gives for this conclusion. / The Pessimistic Induction: From the failure of many specific past attempts at demarcation, Laudan infers that all future attempts at demarcation will fail. For his argument to be fully convincing, Laudan needs to show that each attempt has been a complete failure, and that these failures have never led to progress in the theory of demarcation. I argue that many past attempts at demarcation have only resulted in partial failure, and many of these failures have led to some cumulative progress. So I think we can draw a more optimistic conclusion: future attempts at demarcation may be even more successful than past attempts. / The Pseudo-Problem: Laudan argues that the demarcation problem presupposes an ‘epistemic invariant’: something common to all and only the sciences, which makes them epistemically special. But, says Laudan, this presumption is false – so, by definition, the issue is merely a pseudo-problem. I find Laudan’s argument unconvincing. I present reasons for thinking that the demarcation problem does not, in fact, presuppose an extremely simple epistemic invariant. Furthermore, there may still be a satisfactory, moderately complex epistemic invariant to be found. So I do not think any false assumption is presupposed. / The New Problem: Laudan argues that we should replace the original demarcation problem with a new demarcation problem. I take this to be the problem of demarcating between well-confirmed and ill-confirmed theories. I argue that scientific status is relevant to the confirmation of theories, so the two problems are closely related. I also argue that science has other purposes; so scientific status indicates other virtues besides well-confirmedness. Thus we do want to know which theories and activities are scientific, because this will help us to decide which theories and activities to pursue. So this new demarcation problem is not a suitable replacement for the original problem. / My central question is ‘Has Laudan killed the demarcation problem?’, and my answer is ‘No!’.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/280807 |
| Date | January 2009 |
| Creators | Walsh, Kirsten |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
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