Master of Philosophy / This thesis examines the roles played by philosophy and science in the development of knowl-edge and understanding from ancient times to the present day. It is maintained that the sole contributor to this development has been science, philosophy for the most part acting as an impediment, contrary to the philosophically inspired myth that philosophy lays the groundwork for science, and consonant with the suspicions of most scientists who give thought to the matter. This thesis is expounded from two perspectives, the historical and the analytic. From the historical perspective, Part I of the thesis, the development of scientific ideas is traced in its philosophical context, principally that of the physical sciences from the time of Galileo, but also touching on the position of science in Greek thought. It is concluded that science effectively began with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, and pro-gressed from that time generally in opposition to philosophical dogma, and, once established, almost entirely independently of it. From the analytical perspective, Part II of the thesis, some recent and contemporary philosophical issues in the areas of epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of mind, cen-tred principally on issues concerning the connection between mind and the world, are evalu-ated for their contributions to our current knowledge and understanding. The evaluation is that, by its resort to inappropriate terminology, for the most part philosophy generates confu-sion in matters that in everyday terms are inherently simple and in scientific terms are more complex than philosophers ever imagined—the issue of consciousness is given particular attention. The discussion devolves upon the view, also put forward by Rudolf Carnap in his later years, that controversy in these areas of philosophy arises largely from a confusion of theory with the referents of theory, of word with object, and from the consequent ideological commitment of philosophers to irreconcilable positions in the realist–idealist spectrum. The thesis maintains that although it is a scientific (that is, empirically based) fact that theories, concepts, percepts and the like are constructs of the human mind (suggesting an idealist view, and therefore a fact causing difficulty for realists), it does not follow that the referents of these constructs are themselves constructs of the human mind—indeed, the proposition that they are is without meaning (and hence the realism–idealism dualism is meaningless). This is because the referents of constructs are accessible only by means of those constructs, which do not speak of their own basis in the human mind—the reality of an object referred to depends on the empirical validity of the construct by which the reference is made (and, of course, it may not be real in this sense at all, but be an illusion or a deliberate fiction), not on some philosophical notion of reality. Thus, for example, while the theory of evolution is a human construct, there is no sense in which evolution can be spoken of as a human construct or oth-erwise—evolution is dealt with in its entirety through its theory. Such a resolution of age-old philosophical controversy reflects no more than the human condition (as epitomised by Neurath’s simile of “sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea”), which is fully en-compassed by the scientific approach, and from which there is no escape by means of any religious or philosophical construction.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/283243 |
| Date | January 2005 |
| Creators | Culpin, David |
| Publisher | University of Sydney., Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Language | en_AU |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | The author retains copyright of this thesis., http://www.library.usyd.edu.au/copyright.html |
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