Thesis advisor: Christopher Bruell / This study of Xenophon’s Memorabilia investigates the famous Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. Specifically, it is an attempt to understand the claim that anyone who knows what the right thing is to do, automatically chooses to do it. I concentrate on Socrates’ view of one particular virtue, namely moderation. This is both because moderation is the virtue that Xenophon’s Socrates most often identifies with knowledge, and because it is the virtue that Xenophon associates most closely with Socrates himself. The first part of the dissertation considers whether the thesis that virtue is knowledge is an accurate description of ordinary moral life. The first task is to articulate the ordinary moral outlook. I examine the presentation of this outlook in seven conversations about political ambition in Book Three of the Memorabilia. I conclude that according to Xenophon’s Socrates, the moral outlook is based on two beliefs. One belief concerns the content of the moral law. It is the belief that we are obligated to do good for others, and in the first place to be good citizens and serve our country. The second belief is that morality is good, and the greatest good, for the individual who obeys the moral law, regardless of the apparent sacrifices that it requires. This second belief seems to be the basis for the view that virtue is knowledge: obedience to the moral law is so good that anyone who knew this would automatically obey the law, and anyone who resists obeying it must be ignorant of how good it is. The moral outlook combines these two beliefs. It holds that that what is best for the political community is also best for the individual, or that the law that directs us to do good for others and the law that discloses to us what way of life is best for ourselves are the same law. This belief is so fundamental to the moral life that the question, whether what is good for the individual really coincides with what is good for the community, is not a legitimate question to raise, and it cannot be raised without departing somewhat from the ordinary moral attitude. On the other hand, once the fundamental assumption of moral life comes to light as a mere assumption, it is impossible to avoid investigating it, and to continue to assume that we know what virtue is. Accordingly, the second half of the dissertation attempts to clarify this question, by examining Xenophon’s presentation of the Socratic education in Book Four of the Memorabilia. I argue that this part of the Memorabilia does not assume that virtue is political virtue, and rather shows how Socrates investigated what virtue is without this prior assumption. The last part of the dissertation is a preliminary effort to follow Socrates’ investigation of this question. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2008. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:BOSTON/oai:dlib.bc.edu:bc-ir_101834 |
| Date | January 2008 |
| Creators | Lorch, Benjamin |
| Publisher | Boston College |
| Source Sets | Boston College |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, thesis |
| Format | electronic, application/pdf |
| Rights | Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. |
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