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A Resource Curse for Institutions: Rent Dependency and Quality of Government

Thesis advisor: Richard, S.J. McGowan / The Natural Resource Curse literature proposes to explain why and to what extent resource-wealthy countries have poor economic growth outcomes. Most research focuses on direct economic explanations, considering the role of governing institutions exogenously if at all. One emerging branch of explanations attempts to address this shortcoming, focusing on the indirect effects of institutional deterioration on economic outcomes in resource-rich countries. I add to this emerging literature by performing an econometric analysis of 16 oil-producing nations, examining the impact of national oil rent dependency on 12 dimensions of government quality from 1987-2008. I find that oil dependency has a significant negative impact on government quality in 11 of the 12 dimensions. I also find that controlling for preexisting levels of democracy does not significantly mitigate institutional resource curse effects. This runs counter to findings about economic effects, which tend to disappear when democracy levels are high. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics Honors Program. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Economics.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:BOSTON/oai:dlib.bc.edu:bc-ir_102102
Date January 2010
CreatorsPike, Jonathan R.
PublisherBoston College
Source SetsBoston College
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, thesis
Formatelectronic, application/pdf
RightsCopyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.

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