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以微分賽局論兩國財政政策之競合 / Non-cooperative and Cooperative Fiscal Policies in a Two-coutry Differential Games Model

在一兩開放體系為貨幣同盟與非貨幣同盟的情況下,
本文利用微分賽局理論來探討兩對稱國政府在財政政策上的策略搭配。
本研究分析並比較兩國在貨幣同盟國與非貨幣同盟國中採取合作的財政政策、非合作的財政政策與領導和跟隨者的財政政策等三種不同策略對兩國總體經濟之影響。
最後本文對本研究的模型作數值模擬並試圖利用其結果來闡明目前歐元區國家主權債務危機的可能解決之道。 / Considering both cases of monetary union and non-monetary union, this paper uses the differential game theory to explore the coordination of the fiscal policies between two governments.
In both cases, each country can choose to cooperate in the fiscal policy, not to cooperate in the fiscal policy, or just to follow the policy of the other country. Diffrent stratigical decisions may cause different economic impacts.
Finally, the paper also uses numerical method to simulate our model and provide some possible solutions to the current economic crisis of the Eurozone.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G1003510081
Creators郭哲瑋, Kuo, Je Uei
Publisher國立政治大學
Source SetsNational Chengchi University Libraries
Language中文
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
RightsCopyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders

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