Over the last decades there has been a growing proliferation of international regulatory institutions (fora) with overlapping mandates and ambiguous boundaries. Some international relations scholars argue that institutional density spurs forum shopping - states may choose from among multiple options the one that best meets their policy preference, may play institutions against each other and even replace institutions with which they are dissatisfied. Such patterns have been observed across the global governance system, raising fears that global institutions are losing relevance and that the international system is becoming increasingly anarchic. However, successful forum shopping is rare within global environmental governance despite its high institutional density and often high level of states' institutional dissatisfaction. / This dissertation asks how states respond when their policy preferences are not being met within a global environmental forum and how state responses affect this forum over time. It develops a theoretical framework that conceptualizes forum shopping along a continuum of possible state actions taken when states disagree with the primary forum. This framework proposes that a state's institutional response depends on the institutional design of the primary forum, the state's national interest, and its capabilities. It is tested against empirical evidence from three cases: climate change, trade in endangered species and whaling. Methods comprise structured focused comparison, congruence and process tracing. This dissertation finds that institutional density indeed generates additional opportunities for state action, but finds there is an unwillingness to use them. Global environmental fora exhibit an "engagement pull" on states -- structurally, they have a high level of revisability and there are multiple constraints on the use of other fora. It is demonstrated how arguing and bargaining conducted by the actors at the center of institutional debates help reconstruct challenged institutions as focal points of cooperation; how state dissatisfaction causes institutional proliferation and how states and other actors can pursue a more effective and sustainable governance system.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/U0003390193 |
| Creators | Papa, Mihaela. |
| Publisher | Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University). |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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