<p>This dissertation explores the incentive issues and strategic interactions among decentralized parties in three operations management environments: inventory systems, revenue management and healthcare policies. The first model studies the impact of multilateral asymmetric information about inventories in a two-echelon inventory systems. The second model applies optimization techniques to solve a monopolist's revenue problem where the seller's cost function is not separable across buyers with multidimensional private information. The third model uses a game-theoretical approach to study the decentralized resource allocation between self-interested countries to control an epidemic disease.</p> / Dissertation
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DUKE/oai:dukespace.lib.duke.edu:10161/5652 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Creators | Wang, Shouqiang |
| Contributors | Belloni, Alexandre, Lopomo, Giuseppe |
| Source Sets | Duke University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation |
Page generated in 0.0024 seconds