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Normative Judgments, 'Deep Self' Judgments, and Intentional Action

Sripada and Konrath (forthcoming) use Structural Equation Modeling techniques to provide empirical evidence for the claim that implicit and automatic inferences about people’s dispositions, and not normative judgments, are the driving cause behind the pattern of folk judgments of intentional action in Knobe’s (2003a) chairman case. However, I will argue that their evidence is not as strong as they claim due to the potential of methodological and statistical problems with the way they tested their model. After correcting for these problems, I show that even after accounting for the role of dispositional inferences, normative judgments are still playing a significant role in folk judgments of intentional action.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:GEORGIA/oai:digitalarchive.gsu.edu:philosophy_theses-1085
Date13 April 2011
CreatorsShepard, Jason S
PublisherDigital Archive @ GSU
Source SetsGeorgia State University
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourcePhilosophy Theses

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