Return to search

Organizational design and incentive provision

Made available in DSpace on 2008-05-13T13:16:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
1847.pdf: 405094 bytes, checksum: 02d7abfa691a8d69c5022e083e4e3a83 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2004-06-30 / We model the trade-off between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix or- ganizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high. Moreover, the results show that there is always a level of bias for which matrix design can achieve the expected profit obtained by shareholders if they could directly control the firm. We also show that the main trade-off, i.e., hierarchical versus matrix structure is preserved under asymmetric levels of bias among managers and when low-level workers perceive activities with complementary efforts.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:bibliotecadigital.fgv.br:10438/71
Date30 June 2004
CreatorsCosta, Cristiano Machado
ContributorsEscolas::EPGE, FGV, Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
Source SetsIBICT Brazilian ETDs
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
Sourcereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas, instacron:FGV
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Page generated in 0.002 seconds