The purpose of this dissertation is to advance our understanding of the intentionality and
causal efficacy of mental states. More specifically, the dissertation is intended to help
justify an appeal to teleological functions in the philosophy of mind.
I start by examining the disjunction problem as encountered by causal/
information-theoretic accounts of intentionality. Such accounts individuate the content of
mental states on the basis of their cause or the information they carry. As a result, they
require a principled method of ruling out those cases in which a state is tokened in the
"wrong" circumstances. Without such a method, a state's content could be massively
disjunctive and error would be impossible. The dissertation then considers one type of
purported solution, viz., teleological functionalism. The basic idea is that an analogy
between malfunction and misrepresentation will help solve the disjunction problem by
invoking a suitably naturalised notion of normativity. A state's content need not be what
caused it but, rather, what should have caused it.
I argue that there are two legitimate ways of understanding teleological function in
this context. Selectionist theories— the current favourites— attribute functions on the
basis of selection history; a thing's function is that effect or behaviour for which it has
been selected. In contrast, systems-theoretic accounts attribute function on the basis of an
analysis of components with regard to the workings of a whole; a thing's function is that
effect or behaviour which contributes to the performance of the whole, of which that
thing is a part. Upon examination, it becomes apparent that neither notion of function
meets all the desiderata one might reasonably expect need to be met. This is explicable—
the different notions are suited to two different, though related, explanatory projects.
I argue that selectionist construals of teleological function are appropriate when,
roughly, the project is that of explaining why extant features are present in the
distribution and form that they are. In contrast, systems-theoretic construals of
teleological function are appropriate when, roughly, the project is that of explaining how
these features work. Furthermore, I argue that, from the perspective of a causal/
information-theoretic account, the normativity that is required for the project of
individuating the content of mental states cannot derive solely from history. Knowing
what served one's ancestors is not sufficient for knowing what one is doing now, let alone
what one should be doing now.
A systems-theoretic (and more specifically, a structural) teleological functional
approach to the problem of intentionality, because it is importantly ahistorical, has the
merit of incorporating normative considerations into the philosophy of mind without
rendering the causal efficacy of intentional states unnecessarily mysterious. It also has
the merit of allowing for those attributions of teleological function in biology that would
not be overturned by new evolutionary information regarding selection history.
Adherence solely to an etiological construal of teleological function is too restrictive in
both domains. The dissertation ends with a defence of the structural approach against the
charge that it is too liberal in attributing functions.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:BVAU.2429/6714 |
| Date | 11 1900 |
| Creators | McIntosh, Jillian Scott |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Relation | UBC Retrospective Theses Digitization Project [http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/retro_theses/] |
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