Although most governments sell their bonds through a share auction, little is known about behaviour of bidders in these auctions. This thesis analyzes the literature
on government securities auctions, focusing primarily on structural empirical estimation.
Additionally, it examines bidders behaviour in Colombian government bond auctions during 2007, including the additional sale done after the auction.
The thesis summarizes the different structural methodologies that have been developed to determine what the best auction for a particular case is. It discusses the
advantages and disadvantages of each methodology and explores assumptions and robustness when confronted with data. To make these comparisons more straightforward,
a unified notation is introduced and several methods are applied to the same auctions,
uniform price auctions conducted by the government of Colombia. / Thesis (Ph.D, Economics) -- Queen's University, 2010-01-14 11:03:29.635
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:OKQ.1974/5391 |
| Date | 14 January 2010 |
| Creators | Cardozo, Pamela |
| Contributors | Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Theses (Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.)) |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 608284 bytes, application/pdf |
| Rights | This publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner. |
| Relation | Canadian theses |
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