Marginal pricing is the traditional pricing method in pool based electricity markets, however pay-as-bid is an alternative that has been the focus of recent studies. One way of comparing the outcomes of these two pricing schemes is by examining their market equilibria. These equilibria have been analyzed in depth for both pricing methods under the assumption of a perfect market. Marginal pricing market equilibria has also been examined under oligopolistic markets, however, the same attention has not been given to oligopolies based on pay-as-bid pricing. / In this thesis, we study the possible outcomes of an oligopolistic electricity market under pay-as-bid pricing. For this purpose, we introduce, develop and test a new concept called defensive Nash equilibrium, which combines the risk adverseness of power suppliers with the traditional notion of Nash equilibrium. The test cases studied compare market outcomes between pay-as-bid and marginal pricing under various market power assumptions.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.112570 |
| Date | January 2008 |
| Creators | Ganjbakhsh, Omid. |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Master of Engineering (Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 002711466, proquestno: AAIMR51460, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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