This dissertation comprises three essays under the title "Three Essays on Trade, Resource and Environment". / The first essay develops a model of international duopoly involving competition both in prices and in levels of environmental friendliness, and studies the implications of government policies. It is shown that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, a regulatory increase in the minimum required level of environmental friendliness of the imported goods may harm the home firm, and may result in an increase in the volume of imports. It may also have adverse effects on the environment. Whether consumers lose or gain from such a regulatory increase depends on consumption spillover effects. We also show that, under certain conditions, the duopoly's equilibrium choice of levels of environmental friendliness is socially optimal. / The second essay investigates the properties of the dynamics of population and resource in a model where the objective function is to maximize the utility level of the least advantaged generation. Unlike in models with a utilitarian objective where the typical outcome is a unique steady state, it is found in our model that there is a continuum of steady states. Which steady state will be approached depends on the initial conditions. We show that for relatively large values of the resource stock, each steady state is conditionally stable in the saddlepoint sense; but for small values of the resource stock, the approach path to a steady state is non-monotone in the state space. Along the approach path to a steady state, the implicit discount rate varies over time. / The third essay extends the existing literature on regulation of polluting firms by taking into account the dynamics of investment in pollution abatement capital. It confirms that, under perfect competition, a Pigouvian tax can create the correct incentive for firms to invest and guide firms to achieve the social optimum. This tax path is time consistent. However, when there is a large polluter with price taking behavior, while an efficient and time consistent tax path exists, it is no longer subgame perfect unless the damage cost function is linear in emission. A non-linear taxation rule needs to be designed to achieve the socially optimal outcome. In the case of monopoly, a pair of instruments, an emission tax and a production subsidy, can lead the monopolist to achieve the social optimum. However, if pre-commitment is not possible, it is shown that linear feedback rules cannot achieve the first best outcome.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.38525 |
| Date | January 2002 |
| Creators | Tian, Huilan, 1964- |
| Contributors | Cairns, Robert D. (advisor), Long, Ngo Van (advisor) |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Doctor of Philosophy (Department of Economics.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 001954481, proquestno: NQ85748, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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