Hedge funds introduce considerable volatility into global financial markets. Given the volume of capital they mobilize, hedge funds are capable of precipitating 'herding'---the underlying dynamic behind the transmission of financial distress and the precursor to systemic crises. Greater regulatory oversight of hedge-fund activities could reduce these excesses without necessarily impinging on the self-correcting mechanism of the free market. Presently, there is no regime or monetary authority in place that would compel states to undertake efforts to enhance existing regulatory structures so as to mitigate the exigency of systemic risk. That coordination has not been achieved exposes both the obstacles facing monetary cooperation for establishing a more robust international financial order and the limitations of liberal theories of international cooperation. It also makes evident the importance of hegemonic participation in the construction of economic regimes in an era of accelerating financial globalization.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.99728 |
| Date | January 2006 |
| Creators | Kosobucki, Edwin A. |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Master of Arts (Department of Political Science.) |
| Rights | © Edwin A. Kosobucki, 2006 |
| Relation | alephsysno: 002599178, proquestno: AAIMR32532, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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