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Three Essays on Mortgage Securitizations

This dissertation studies how the affiliation between different entities in securitization process make different market outcomes, and how this estimation of affiliation effects is susceptible to limitations in securitized residential mortgage data. Three essays constitute the dissertation.
The first essay illustrates the limitations and potential bias in the loan-level trustee data. Substantial amounts of loan attributes and risk factors are missing. The patterns of data omissions dramatically vary across different risk factors, sponsors, and trustees, and over the time. Missing of one risk factor is in general positively correlated with missing of the other. Omissions of loan attributes are systematically associated with intermediate level of ex-post default risk. These findings suggest that if any data is sliced and diced based on the availability of loan attributes, the sample for default regression model may not be random.
The second essay examines how default risk is associated with the affiliation between the loan provider and the sponsor. The identity of loan provider is, however, selectively disclosed for riskier mortgages. Without consideration of this selective disclosure, the affiliation is seemingly linked to higher ex-ante and ex-post default risk. In contrast, if the affiliation is correctly calculated by backfilling loan provider identity, or if the sample selection problem is explicitly addressed, then loan providers cherry-pick mortgages with better ex-ante risk characteristics for their affiliated securitizations. Also, with more complete sample where missing and erroneous loan provider identities are backfilled and corrected, the affiliation between the loan provider and the sponsor is shown to significantly decrease the likelihood of default.
The third essay examines why sponsors are concerned about the performance of mortgages even after they are securitized and sold to investors in the form of bonds. Without any empirical tests, previous studies assume that sponsors have skin in the game because they retain the certificates backed by the residual tranches. However, I show that sponsors with their own servicing platform increase their servicing quality even after the most junior tranche has dried up. This result implies reputational concerns may make sponsors care about performance of securitized mortgages.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:LSU/oai:etd.lsu.edu:etd-07072014-114838
Date23 July 2014
CreatorsLee, Hong
ContributorsMason, Joseph, Pace, Kelley, Narayanan, Rajesh, Hill, Carter, Karunatillake, Suniti
PublisherLSU
Source SetsLouisiana State University
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
Sourcehttp://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-07072014-114838/
Rightsunrestricted, I hereby certify that, if appropriate, I have obtained and attached herein a written permission statement from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis, dissertation, or project report, allowing distribution as specified below. I certify that the version I submitted is the same as that approved by my advisory committee. I hereby grant to LSU or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible, under the conditions specified below and in appropriate University policies, my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation or project report. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, dissertation, or project report.

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