In this thesis, I analyze the classical tripartite definition of knowledge. According to this definition there are three conditions for a knowledge claim to arise, namely, belief, truth and justification conditions. The main problem with this definition is even if these three conditions are satisfied one may not know a proposition p because of the fact that the justification of the proposition p may not be relevant in showing that p is true. Therefore, my primary purpose is to establish a strong conceptual connection between justification and truth conditions. To realize this, first, I defend a three-way interrelation between these three conditions. Second, I inquire as to which kind of justification should lead us to which kind of truth. To answer to this question, I postulate three kinds of realities, namely, Subjective Reality, Inter-Subjective Reality, and Allegedly Pure Reality. Furthermore, I re-define the justification condition in such way that there is a kind of whole justification and it requires both internal and external justification. According to this conception of reality and re-definition of justification there already exists a strong conceptual connection between internal justification and Subjective Reality which is completely subject-relative. And I defend the existence of such a connection also between the whole justification and Inter-Subjective Reality. Finally, I argue that no conception of justification can lead us to an Allegedly Pure Reality that the hardest version of skepticism claims to exist.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:METU/oai:etd.lib.metu.edu.tr:http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/1214535/index.pdf |
| Date | 01 August 2003 |
| Creators | Arici, Murat |
| Contributors | Grunberg, David |
| Publisher | METU |
| Source Sets | Middle East Technical Univ. |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | M.S. Thesis |
| Format | text/pdf |
| Rights | To liberate the content for public access |
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