This thesis explores possibilities for extending the features of honeypot systems to decrease the chance of an attacker discovering that they have compromised a honeypot. It is proposed that by extending the period of time that an attacker spends on a honeypot oblivious to its status, more information relevant to profiling the attacker can be gained. Honeypots are computer systems that are deployed in a way that attackers can easily compromise them. These systems, which contain no production data, are useful both as early warning systems for attacks on production systems, and for studying the tools, techniques, and motives of attackers. Current honeypot systems mitigate the risks of running a honeypot by restricting out-bound traffic in a way that might be obvious to an attacker. The extensions proposed for honeypots will be tested in a controlled laboratory environment.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:MSSTATE/oai:scholarsjunction.msstate.edu:td-3167 |
| Date | 10 December 2005 |
| Creators | McGrew, Robert Wesley |
| Publisher | Scholars Junction |
| Source Sets | Mississippi State University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Theses and Dissertations |
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