Abstract
This paper shows that collusive behavior of firms in production with lump-sum payment licensing may occur in an infinitely repeated duopoly if both firms adopt a two-period strategy to interact with each other. It is profitable for the patent-holding firm with non-drastic cost-reducing innovation to use licensing as a strategic means to induce the opponent to cooperate in pursuit of joint profit. It is proved that there exists a Pareto dominant two-period strategy profile, which is an equilibrium in both equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium paths. Furthermore, it is shown that the duration of punishment while two firms are in the out-of-equilibrium is endogenously determined.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0616108-002840 |
| Date | 16 June 2008 |
| Creators | Lo, Shiau-wei |
| Contributors | chen jian-hua, Liu,Tru-Gin, Wang Chun-Chieh |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0616108-002840 |
| Rights | not_available, Copyright information available at source archive |
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