When a privately-held firm goes public through an IPO ¡]initial public offering¡^, the ownership structure of the IPO firm would change due to external equity financing. The ownership structure is related to the firm performance with respect to the corporate finance theory. Therefore, we agree that the relationship between the ownership structure and IPO long-run performance is worth examining.
With respect to the corporate control and agency theory, we investigate the effect of the increase of insider ownership on the performance of IPO firms. We show that the increase of board ownership deteriorates the long-run performance of IPO firms. However, the increase of the institutional ownership improves IPO long-run performance. Basically, the agency theory implies that there exists positive relations between the insider ownership and performance and between the institutional ownership and performance. However, the corporate control theory agrees that the higher the insider ownership, the poorer the performance of the firms. Therefore, our results show that the institutional ownership can mitigate the agency problem while the role of corporate control subsumes the agency problem with respect to the insider ownership.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0620100-143031 |
| Date | 20 June 2000 |
| Creators | Liu, Li-Shih |
| Contributors | Chris Liao, Anlin Chen, Ruey-Dang Chang |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0620100-143031 |
| Rights | unrestricted, Copyright information available at source archive |
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