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The Monopolist¡¦s Optimal Allocation of Advertising and Pricing under the Threat of the Potential Firm

This article aims at exploring how the monopolist determines the optimal allocation of advertising and pricing when he faces the threat of the potential firm entering the market. When consumers are unable to distinguish the quality of a commodity, they will use the weighted average willingness to pay of the high quality and the low quality goods to be the willingness to pay for the commodity. Because that the average willingness to pay is different among consumers of different types, thus the monopolist¡¦s decisions concerning the allocation of advertising budget and pricing will be influenced. We found that no matter what the average willingness to pay is, as long as the monopolist has the ability to compete against price, the expenditure on advertising will be larger; otherwise, the expenditure on advertising will be smaller.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0707111-164717
Date07 July 2011
CreatorsLee, Ching-wei
ContributorsShan-non Chin, Ssu-shen Chen, Tru-Gin Liu
PublisherNSYSU
Source SetsNSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive
LanguageCholon
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
Sourcehttp://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0707111-164717
Rightscampus_withheld, Copyright information available at source archive

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