In this paper, we will construct a quantity-setting mixed duopoly market model, in which a individual enterprise and a privatization public enterprise. Two enterprises carry out Cournot competition, in order to analyse the economic result of privatization. The traditional economic theory is supposed, the individual enterprise pursues the maximization of profits, and the public enterprise pursues the social welfare maximization. This text introduces the trade union in the model, consider how many shares the government should hold the privatization public enterprise. If the privatization policy needs to pass the negotiation of trade union, we can make use of union-firm bargaining to analyse this problem. We find no matter complete privatization(government does not hold any shares) or the complete nationalization is not all the optimal market structure under privatization. In the past literatures, privatization perhaps can not improve the social welfare. We discover the result that if the strength of trade union change from strong to weak under the privatization policy, then the social welfare may be improved.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0711105-185341 |
| Date | 11 July 2005 |
| Creators | Lu, Li-Fong |
| Contributors | Shan-non Chin, Tru-Gin Lau, none |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0711105-185341 |
| Rights | campus_withheld, Copyright information available at source archive |
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