Because of recent corporate scandals, auditor independence and turnover have become the focus of much debate. For strengthening auditor independence , American government compulsorily stipulate that the firm has to replace its auditor every five years in Sarbanes-Oxley Act that was passed in 2002 to ensure that the increasing tenure can¡¦t lead to an bad audit quality. However, not every scholar all supports the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In order to analyze these issues, we try to find out the relation between the length of auditor tenure and behavior of corporate income tax evasion and auditor independence by using game theory and bargaining model.
Our main results are as follows. In our model, we suppose the auditor bargaining ability is positively related to tenure. Manager will gain lower benefits of tax evasion with increasing auditor bargaining ability, implying that increasing tenure reduces managerial collusion incentives. Finally, manager decides to report higher income. In contrast, auditor will gain higher benefits of tax evasion with increasing auditor bargaining ability. But for the auditor, the precondition of making company to be willing to collude with auditor is to possess the evidence of corporate income tax evasion. Because of that, auditor will increase the level of auditing efforts and choose to help company to make an incorrect attestation. So increasing tenure will influence auditor independence and audit quality.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0714110-153207 |
| Date | 14 July 2010 |
| Creators | Liu, Yi-ting |
| Contributors | Chen,Shin-Shen, Liu,Tru-Gin, Chin,Shan-non |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0714110-153207 |
| Rights | not_available, Copyright information available at source archive |
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