This dissertation consists of three theoritical chapters. In the first chapter, I study an
evolutionary model with a finite population of boundedly rational agents, who do not have
access to the same amount of information. Time is discrete, and in each period two agents
are paired to play a 2 × 2 symmetric coordination game. Each player can cross paths with
two kinds of opponents: Neighbors or Strangers. If a player faces a Neighbor, she can access
some information about her opponents past plays, and plays using a myopic best-response.
But if she faces a Stranger, she does not have access to any information, and therefore plays
according to a casebased decision rule. I show that in the short run, segregated localities
emerge, to finally disappear in the long run, in favor of the Pareto Efficient convention. The
main contribution of this chapter is that I show that agents coordinate in an evolutionary
framework on an efficient outcome, even when information is asymmetric, without assuming
any pre-play communication or mobility of the agents.
In the second chapter (with Alexander Matros) we consider K finite populations of
boundedly rational agents whose preferences and information differ. Each period agents are
randomly paired to play some coordination games. We show that several special (fixed)
agents lead the coordination. In a mistake-free environment, all connected fixed agents have
to coordinate on the same strategy. In the long run, as the probability of mistakes goes to
zero, all agents coordinate on the same strategy. The long-run outcome is unique, if all fixed
agents belong to the same population.
The last chapter (with Alexander Matros) considers a public good game similar to the one
iii
in Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked [14], which benefits are only local. We find some sufficient
conditions which when applied to a particular set of graphs ensure the survival of Altruism.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:PITT/oai:PITTETD:etd-04022007-104824 |
| Date | 22 June 2007 |
| Creators | Masson, Virginie Anne Joelle |
| Contributors | Robert Gilles, Ted Temzelides, Alexander Matros, Andreas Blume, John Duffy |
| Publisher | University of Pittsburgh |
| Source Sets | University of Pittsburgh |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-04022007-104824/ |
| Rights | unrestricted, I hereby certify that, if appropriate, I have obtained and attached hereto a written permission statement from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis, dissertation, or project report, allowing distribution as specified below. I certify that the version I submitted is the same as that approved by my advisory committee. I hereby grant to University of Pittsburgh or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible, under the conditions specified below, my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation or project report. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, dissertation, or project report. |
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