This thesis explores the impact that Chinese aid and investment has on the political economy of resource-rich African countries. In particular, it examines the effects of Chinese resource-for-infrastructure agreements on the political economy of the resource curse. Using Ghana as a case study, this thesis highlights the peculiar obstacles that countries face with regard to managing their resources. In turn, it argues that general prescriptions against the resource curse, such as resource revenue transparency initiatives, like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, are insufficient. As a result, African recipients of Chinese aid require specific institutional arrangements that accurately reflect the specific “rules of the game” that exist under their respective political economies. In the case of Ghana, this thesis argues that vetting Chinese
resource-for-infrastructure agreements through the Public Procurement Act serves that need.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TORONTO/oai:tspace.library.utoronto.ca:1807/30168 |
| Date | 01 December 2011 |
| Creators | Asiedu-Akrofi, Harvey |
| Contributors | Trebilcock, Michael |
| Source Sets | University of Toronto |
| Language | en_ca |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
Page generated in 0.0015 seconds