My dissertation focuses on the role of incentives in the workplace. In Chapter 1, I study peer effects in pay-for-individual-performance jobs. Specifically, I explore whether, how, and why coworker performance matters when rewards are based on individual performance. When teamed with high-performing peers, I find that workers are more productive overall. I also find that workers who resign are unaffected by coworker performance in the period after they hand in their resignation notice. The findings suggest peer effects in pay-for-individual-performance jobs reflect reputational concerns about relative performance rather than competitive preferences.
In Chapter 2, I present field evidence that sheds new light on incentive provision in multitask jobs. Specifically, I design and conduct a field experiment at a large-scale restaurant, where the pre-existing wage contract encourages workers to carry out their tasks in a way that is not perfectly aligned with the firm's preferences. The experimental treatment pays bonuses to waiters for the number of customers they serve, in addition to their tips for customer service and hourly wages. I compare worker performance under the treatment to that under the pre-existing contract, where workers are rewarded for overemphasizing customer service, to evaluate the effect of a wage contract that encourages undesirable behavior. I find that the average worker earns more, is more productive, and generates higher short-run profits for the firm when paid bonuses for customer volume. Overall, the findings suggest that sharpening wage contracts to deal with incentive problems in multitask jobs has benefits for workers as well as the firm.
In Chapter 3, I present joint work (with Arvind N. Magesan at the University fo Calgary) on the beauty premium's role in the workplace. Specifically, we investigate whether, how, and why the beauty premium can be explained by the behaviour of workers after they are hired. We find that attractive workers earn more because they transfer effort from tasks that reward looks to tasks that reward effort. We also provide evidence against favorable treatment by customers and the employer as sources for the beauty premium. We conclude that the premium is largely driven by the worker's on-the-job behavior.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TORONTO/oai:tspace.library.utoronto.ca:1807/31799 |
| Date | 10 January 2012 |
| Creators | Kapoor, Sacha |
| Contributors | Benjamin, Dwayne |
| Source Sets | University of Toronto |
| Language | en_ca |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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