碩士 / 淡江大學 / 美國研究所 / 90 / Base on U.S. government newly declassified documents and cross-strait high-ranked commanders who had ever battled in second “Quemoy-Matsu Crisis” recently published so-called oral history and memoirs in few years, this thesis main purpose therefore is aimed to revisit and reexamine the decision-making process of U.S. government in 1958 crisis through Graham Allison’s three decision-making models and Glenn Snyder’s protector matrix of asymmetrical game theory.
Secondly, this thesis also attempted to set up an explanatory framework for U.S. government alternative intervening model while cross-straits erupt conflict. Under the consideration of American own interest, author found that, Eisenhower administration inclined to promote GRC withdrawing from offshore islands much more aggressive in calm period than in crisis escalation. American was used to play two kinds of role in crisis in turn. But all went into the same destination of either maintaining or returning to “status quo” no matter she being a protector against PRC in defensive or a balancer in offensive position. The U.S. government optimal strategy to Taiwan and Offshore Islands was keeping cross-straits Chinas’ counter-payoff on dynamic Equilibrium in according with crisis situation evolution.
Meanwhile, applied to scholastic “limited war” study approach, the thesis tried to account for what Communist China fade out its shelling to offshore Islands without amphibious landing and how Eisenhower Administration successfully persuaded GRC partially withdraw military deployment from Quemoy and Matsu. This thesis argues that U.S.-PRC-GRC of each party leader hold their self-restraint in force was the major factor of not resulted in brink of nuclear war.
To sum and last, author presented three viewpoints in conclusion. First, U.S. government fated to lose advantages on their military instrument derived from her “strategic ambiguity” policy toward Taiwan. Second, both cross-straits leaders intended to grab their individual political interests through war and would like to detect U.S. government willingness of intervention. Third, the authorization of nuclear weapons hold on president’s totally controlled and the State Department took charge of all crisis management was essential and responsible.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/090TKU00232010 |
| Date | January 2002 |
| Creators | Lee Chia-pin, 李嘉賓 |
| Contributors | Edward I-shin Chen, 陳一新 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | zh-TW |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Format | 154 |
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