碩士 / 國立東華大學 / 國際經濟研究所 / 91 / This thesis applies Grossman-Helpman’s (1994) common agency game model to investigate how the industrial policies, i.e., the minimum wage and the equipment export tax, change in the presence of lobbying. First, we investigate how the two policies affect domestic production firm’s and outsourcing firm’s profits. From which, we show the motivations for both firms to engage in lobbying. Second, we show that both policies are higher than the social welfare maximized level in the presence of lobbying. Last, we prove that the equilibrium contributions for both interest groups are strictly positive, which implies that both interest groups can capture some rent from lobbying activity.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/091NDHU5324009 |
| Date | January 2003 |
| Creators | PEI-JU TSAI, 蔡佩如 |
| Contributors | Chelsea C. Lin, 林奇蓉 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | zh-TW |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Format | 27 |
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