碩士 / 國立臺灣海洋大學 / 應用經濟研究所 / 92 / The goals of implementation of the National Health Insurance, an insurance system of social welfare enforced by law, consist of seeking social welfare, reducing financial burden of the disadvantaged and high-risk groups, and ensuring the availability of basic medical care to the public. The government ensures the mutual sharing characteristic of social welfare users’ financial responsibility by means of tax revenues and all or part of the insurance premium shared by the insured and insuring organizations.
Fishery itself is an occupation of high risk, unstable income, and strenuous labor. In addition, the depletion of natural resources, severe contamination in the coastal waters, and re-occurrence of violence and bloodshed involving crew members further dampen the inclination of current younger generation to adopt the career of fishery, thus leading to the severe shortage in fishing labor.
After implementation of the National Health Insurance Act, the government has targeted the fishermen by providing the supplemented-premium policy in order to optimize their health care. In other words, the Fishermen Health Insurance is a system of social insurance with which the government carries out its social policies, maintains the health of the fishermen, promotes the welfare of the fishing population, and improves the stability of fishing villages, with the main purpose of ensuring basic health care for the fishing population.
Under current economic hardship facing the fishery business and the government’s implementation of the policy of fishing vessels reduction, the number of Class A members in the Fishermen’s Association and the insured under the Fishermen’s Health Insurance should theoretically be decreasing yearly. However, the number of Class A members in the Fishermen’s Association increased from 238,681 in 1997 to 342,411 in 2003, representing a 43% increase. The number of the insured fishermen and their families also increased from 445,365 in 1997 to 603,956 in 2002, equaling a growth of 36%.
There are some possible underlying reasons for the above phenomena. The supplemented-premium policy by the government which allows low self-paid premiums by the fishermen could foster unethical insuring behavior such false reporting of fishermen identity. The imperfection in regulation and loose criteria in screening for the qualification for fishermen health insurance were the main reasons that brought about these abnormal phenomena. If there is no proper correction of the current situation, the limited resources of the government’s welfare policy for the fishing population will be abused, and as a consequence, will negatively influence the development of our country’s fishery business. The original purpose of implementation of the National Health Insurance will also be defeated.
This study uses information from survey questionnaires sent to fishermen as well as data from related administrative departments in charge of the Fishermen’s Health Insurance, including the city and county governments and fishermen’s associations. This study analyzes the data in regards to various adjustments in the health insurance premiums and reviews the current system and regulations. Integrating the results of the analysis, this study discusses the proper regulatory system and policy for the Fishermen’s Health Insurance.
The following conclusions are based on the results of this study: 1) The number of members in the fishermen’s associations do not accurately reflect the number of those who are actually engaged in the fishery business; 2) The government should reinforce the regulations on members of the fishermen’s associations and restrict the owners of the fishing vessels from hiring crew members; 3) Requiring basic safety training for fishing crew and the implementation of the newly revised “Review of Qualification and Criteria of Certification for the Fishermen’s Associations in Taiwan Province” can effectively reduce the inappropriate enrollment of non-fishing population in the Fishermen’s Health Insurance; 4) Fishermen would not likely object to a basic application fee for Fishing Crew Identification; 5) The government can provide more welfare policies for the fishing population since they are still inadequate compared to other labor force; 6) If the government can effectively regulate the member qualification for the fishermen’s associations and reduce the member numbers by 20%, the government will be able to raise the insurance premium supplement from the initial 70% to 75% without suffering any additional financial burden, and thus can affirm the policy of caring for the fishing population.
In order to enforce the government’s policy on caring for the fishing population, the author has the following suggestions based on the results of this study: 1) The government should establish regulations on member qualification for the fishermen’s associations to reflect the actual number of those who are in the business of fishery; 2) The government should restrict the owners of fishing vessels from hiring a large number of fishing crew and implement the unemployment financial assistance for the fishermen; 3) After effective control of the member number of the fishermen’ associations, the government should accordingly increase the proportion of the insured in the fishing population in order to attract more fishing labor; 4) The government can charge proper application fees for Fishing Crew Identification and transfer these funds into the Fishermen Benefit Foundation to ultimately benefit the fishermen.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/092NTOU5452012 |
| Date | January 2004 |
| Creators | Yung-Yang Cheng, 鄭永陽 |
| Contributors | Ching-Chun Chen, Fan-Hua Nan, 陳清春, 冉繁華 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | zh-TW |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Format | 109 |
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