碩士 / 淡江大學 / 美國研究所 / 93 / With the occurrence of the two offshore-island crises in the Taiwan Strait during the Cold War Era, the whole world suddenly fixed attention on the previously unknown offshore islands lying off the coast of Mainland China. During these crises, the U.S. repeatedly warned the PRC, and moved forward with the signing of a mutual defense treaty and a joint communiqué with the ROC. When the tensions escalated, the U.S. assisted in evacuating the Dachens and passed the Taiwan Strait Resolution, which provided a legal basis for U.S. assistance in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. Besides, U.S. leaders announced the possible use of atomic weapons should that become necessary to defend Quemoy, and sent a huge armada of warships to the Taiwan Strait. For some time, it seemed as if the U.S. was ready to fight in defense of the offshore islands, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait was near breaking point.
To determine whether the U.S. was truly willing to defend the offshore islands, this thesis applies the Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM) and Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as discussed in the decision-making theory developed by Dr. Graham Allison, a well-known scholar at Harvard University. It also adopts the comparative analysis method to examine the evolution of U.S. decision-making process, and the reasons behind, in the interest of making a comprehensive view of U.S. policy with regard to the offshore islands, and in realizing the real essence of U.S. policy towards China in the 1950s.
Findings of this thesis show that in the first crisis, the U.S. was in fact not willing to fight for the defense of the offshore islands. However, because of the insistence on the policy of “massive retaliation,” the U.S. was forced to be involved. And in the second crisis, the U.S. again got involved in the defense of the offshore islands in a limited manner because the ROC had stationed more than a third of its army on the offshore islands. This made the defense of offshore islands closely related to the morale of the ROC and, therefore, to the defense of Taiwan.
By comparing the decision-making processes adopted during the two offshore-island crises, it is evident from the findings of this study that U.S. policy toward the offshore islands was changeable. The evolution of domestic and international situations, and the extent of impendence of the crises, all contributed to changes in U.S. policy towards the offshore islands. Furthermore, it was found out that the process of maximizing the interests of individual organizations and the result of interaction between government department secretaries and the President also influenced the results of decision-making.
Regarding the use of nuclear weapons, it was obvious that U.S. leaders had different views during the two crises. Since the USSR had made a great progress with nuclear weapons after the mid-1950s, the doctrine of “massive retaliation” was seriously doubted because it relied heavily on the power of nuclear weapons to deter the Communists. Besides, since the U.S.-U.S.S.R relationship had moved toward détente after the mid-1950s, the arms race also began to ease. This explains why President Eisenhower had seriously considered using nuclear weapons to deter the PRC in the first crisis, but refused the use of nuclear weapons in the early days of the second crisis. Interestingly, instead of using nuclear weapons for defending the offshore islands, the U.S. had deployed a huge armada of warships in the Taiwan Strait, which gave the strong impression of U.S. determination to fight in defense of the offshore islands.
Finally, the offshore-island crises made the U.S. reconsider its policy toward China seriously. In order to defuse the dangerous situation in the offshore islands, which many feared would lead to World War III, the U.S. did its utmost to prevent the ROC from attacking Mainland China and dragging the U.S. into war with the PRC as a way to retake the mainland. The U.S. also maneuvered a “two-Chinas” proposal in an effort to cause a permanent state of division across the Taiwan Strait and then keep the strategic offshore defense line on the Pacific perimeter intact for a long time.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/093TKU00232005 |
| Date | January 2005 |
| Creators | Ming-feng Yu, 游銘豐 |
| Contributors | 陳一新 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | zh-TW |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Format | 154 |
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