碩士 / 亞洲大學 / 國際企業學系碩士班 / 94 / MNEs’ foreign direct investments are being done daily. China has become an important place to produce IT and 3C products. Taiwan’s investments in China exceed 2/3 of all oversea, especial electronic apparatus manufacturing industry. Therefore, how can the government help Taiwan MNEs to carry on the global overall arrangement, to get a ticket into China, and prevent spillover effect?
This paper adopts the game theory to research MNEs’ strategy under government policy. And use a design program software “Mathematica 5.1” to deal with the model (ie. Cournot quantity competition). According to the function & figures to analyze government policy and MNEs’ strategy.
This research discovered: The government of home country, Taiwan, makes one powerful “control policy” toward MNEs’, but not a reward policy. When the government adopts “semi-control policy of FDI or export”, MNEs’ investment causes technology spillover effect. Giving those firms of host country, China, a chance to enter the market and share the profit. In addition, when MNEs fall into the prisoner dilemma between FDI and spillover. The government could implement a “control export policy” to force firms choose the FDI strategy, then reach Pareto optimality.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/094THMU0321004 |
| Date | January 2005 |
| Creators | Yu-Chuan Chen, 陳玉娟 |
| Contributors | Keng-Shen Chen, 陳更生 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | zh-TW |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Format | 0 |
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