碩士 / 開南大學 / 空運管理學系 / 98 / The current air routes subsidy system is applied by airline companies which are then audited by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to determine whether to give full or partial amount of the loss. A Cooperative game seeks to optimize the overall interest of the game, which in turn allows the CAA and airline companies to reach agreements. Therefore, a joint effort is required from both parties to forecast the airline's revenue and cost expenditure. To achieve a standard close to the prediction, a mechanism is established so that the proposed subsidies can be used as a reference for auditing. The main purpose behind the cooperation and mechanism are to reduce data discrepancy and to improve the transparent between CAA and airline companies.
The Shapley value is an evaluative figure that determines the co-benefits for the two parties.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/098KNU00783010 |
| Date | January 2010 |
| Creators | Hung Yi Chen, 洪一錚 |
| Contributors | Chin-Ho Lai, 賴金和 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | zh-TW |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Format | 56 |
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