Time-definite Common Carriers Network Design under Leader-Follower Game / 考慮主從式競爭關係下之最佳營運網路設計-以路線貨物運輸業為例

碩士 / 國立成功大學 / 交通管理學系碩博士班 / 101 / Less-than truckload carriers collect small parcels from various shippers. They build a hub-and-spoke network to reduce the operational cost by increasing the truckloads. LTL industry typically consists of a handful of carriers. A carrier’s long-term hub network design may be influenced by the decisions of other carriers. In this research we study the integrated pricing and hub network design under Stackelberg duopolistic leader-follower game. We showed that the leader may exercise the spatial agglomeration economy to drive the follower to operational break even without profits. Even though the leader may sacrifice his profit, he may gain a monopolistic power, if the follower exit the market.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:TW/101NCKU5119024
Date January 2013
CreatorsJian-ChingChen, 陳建青
ContributorsCheng-Chang Lin, 林正章
Source SetsNational Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan
Languagezh-TW
Detected LanguageEnglish
Type學位論文 ; thesis
Format44

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