碩士 / 國立中山大學 / 社會學系碩士班 / 101 / Social scientists have been interested in “the tragedy of the commons” for a long time. Research teams led by Elinor Ostrom, among others, have found a large number of cases in which local communities have owned and regulated the common-pool resources. In other words, in addition to the two models of “centralization” (state-oriented) and “privatization” (market-oriented) popular among social scientists, there exists an alternative model of self-governed common-property arrangement that
effectively avoids the tragedy of the commons.
This thesis is a case study of the sergestid shrimp fishery in Tongkang, Taiwan. Employing Elinor Ostrom and others’ analytic framework, it attempts to analyze the modus operandi of the fishery and explore the conditions under which local people can successfully govern the common-pool resource from the bottom up in a democratic manner.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/101NSYS5208003 |
| Date | January 2013 |
| Creators | Yi-Chieh Lee, 李懿潔 |
| Contributors | Yu-Ze Wen, 萬毓澤 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | zh-TW |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Format | 87 |
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