碩士 / 國立臺北大學 / 經濟學系 / 101 / Based on the framework of Chen and Liu (2013a), this thesis analyzes the optimal concession contracts of a fee-revenue maximizing landlord port authority under the price (Bertrand) competition of two terminal operators. We construct a two-stage game to describe the interactions between the port authority and terminal operators. In the first stage, the port authority announces a contract. Given the contract, two operators choose equilibrium prices independently and simultaneously in the second stage. Three types of contracts, two-part tariff scheme, unit-fee scheme and fixed-fee scheme, are considered in our model. We discover that the two-part tariff scheme is the best contract when the marginal costs of the less-efficient operator are small. In the remaining cases, the two-part tariff and the unit-fee schemes are equally preferred by the port authority.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/101NTPU0389008 |
| Date | January 2013 |
| Creators | Lin, Yen-Hung, 林彥宏 |
| Contributors | Chen, Hsiao-Chi, 陳孝琪 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | zh-TW |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Format | 44 |
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