碩士 / 國立臺灣大學 / 科際整合法律學研究所 / 101 / Offshore havens- formally known as tax havens or offshore financial centers in the international tax or financial regimes- are largely small countries or jurisdicttions famous (or infamous?) for their tax policy and financial information secrecy. Though a lot of research has been done to determine whether such havens have caused or will cause damage to the stability of international tax or financial system(s), and the total well-being of all humans for that matter as well, much less has been devoted to their impact on corporate governance, which made its prominent appearing in the Eron case during the turn of the 21st century. Since only the miltinational corporations would use offshore havens as part of their business strategies or planning, and one cannot seriously talk about corporate governance without notifying the corporate in the first place, this thesis would try to fulfill that void (impact of offshore havens on corporate governance) by first acknowledging that the corporate governance (structure) of miltinational corporations is much more different, difficult and complicated than that of domestic firms due to both their transnational-dealing nature and complex organizational structure, and then going into discussing how offshore havens’ tax policy and financial information secrecy each in general would aggrevate the situation. Figuratively speaking, if the financial information secrecy of offshore havens is the Graet Wall to protect any information insiders secretly held from outsiders or government autority, the special tax policy of offshore havens is the black hole sucking all the information so that there won’t be any effective exchange of information at all. To cure these information-asymmetry problems, international organizations like OECD or FATF eager to fulfill their missions of fighting tax evasion and money laundry/terrorism financing by bringing transparency into offshore havens would help, but without deeper undeastanding of offshore havens and how they make their livings, one would never truly succeed for that the information seekers are naturally and substantially disadvantageous to the infornation holders/givers in the first place, especially given that there’s no motivation and benefits to the latter to cooperate with the former, let alone there might even come a lot of harm to them. Offshore havens could simply adapt “commit but not comply” strategy to delay and retard any meningful exchange of information while taking the heat off imposed by the mainstream international society (by simply “committing”). Hence some scholars have proposed that an international or tran-govermental information market would make transnational exchange of information more sucessful and efficient, and beneficial to all countries and jurisdictions involved. The author of this thesis prefers this method to oppressive and extortionary one the OECD and FATF currently employed to deal with information problems created by offshore havens- information is never free; we just take it for granted for a long time.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/101NTU05195013 |
| Date | January 2013 |
| Creators | Tien-Kun Liu, 劉定坤 |
| Contributors | 王文宇 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | zh-TW |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Format | 207 |
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