碩士 / 國立政治大學 / 東亞研究所 / 102 / As China's comprehensive national power rises with its rapid economic growth, it becomes more capable of protecting its core interests. In addition, China published the white paper on China's peaceful development in 2011, which officially defined the concept of “core interests”. As a global hegemon, the U.S. strives to secure regional stability in East Asia, which is so-called Pax Americana. Although the U.S. proposed “the U.S. Return to Asia” strategy in July 2009, confrontation in the South China Sea between China and other claimants still continues. This thesis discusses the impact of the U.S. return to Asia on China's South China Sea policy.
The thesis analyzes “the U.S. Return to Asia” strategy from military, diplomatic, and economic perspectives. In terms of defense, the U.S. not only strengthens military presence and reinforces deterrence capability, but also adjusts military posture to comply with military budget cuts. With respect to diplomacy, the U.S. launches “forward-deployed diplomacy” strategy, aiming at consolidating its commitment to East Asian countries and gaining support from them. When it comes to economic development, the U.S. strategy focuses on opening new markets and stimulating exports by boosting economic cooperation with East Asian countries. However, in the short run, “the U.S. Return to Asia” strategy has no significant policy impact except diplomatic efforts.
In spite of pursuing for a peaceful international environment and favorable external conditions in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development, China's attitude toward core interest issues has become much tougher in recent years. For example, China has taken a proactive role in the South China Sea disputes since 2009.
On the one hand, the thesis verifies that the core underpinning of “the U.S. Return to Asia” strategy is on diplomacy. On the other hand, the thesis contends that rapidly shrinking U.S.-China GDP gap is the major determinant of China's assertive South China Sea policy. Furthermore, the impact of “the U.S. Return to Asia” strategy depends on Chinese policymakers' perceptions of the strategy. In short, “limited assertiveness” (i.e. not dispatching navy but using non-military means such as assertive law enforcement) is not only the optimal strategy for China to resolve disputes in the South China Sea after the U.S. return to Asia, but also part of its “pragmatic coopetition” strategy. As such, the impact of the U.S. return to Asia on China's South China Sea policy is examined insignificant.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/102NCCU5189003 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Huang, Hua Hsi, 黃華璽 |
| Contributors | Liu, Fu Kuo, 劉復國 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | zh-TW |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Format | 240 |
Page generated in 0.02 seconds