碩士 / 中原大學 / 會計研究所 / 103 / Foreign investment complicates the financial statements which results in serious problem of information asymmetry between the managers and the shareholders. Since the managers have the incentive to influence the strategy of foreign investment with their right of control, the speculative decision of foreign investment is made within the corporates.This study aims to investigate the impact of company’s foreign investment on firm value, and to examine whether the coexistence of central agency problems and traditional agency problems affect the relevance between foreign investment and firm value. The sample of this study is the listed companies in Taiwan from 2000 to 2013..Empirical result shows that a foreign investment can increase company’s market value if the investment industry is similar to the company’s industry, indicating that the foreign investment is related with company’s business, it will have positive influence on company’s market value. Secondly, compared with the company which solely has either traditional or central agency problem, the company with coexistence of central agency problems and traditional agency problems has decreased the positive relation between foreign investment and firm value. In other words, when the corporate simultaneously has the traditional and central agency problems, the managers have incentive to hide company’s real value while executing foreign investment strategy, which further decreases firm value.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/103CYCU5385024 |
| Date | January 2015 |
| Creators | Yi-Sin Li, 李羿欣 |
| Contributors | Chao-Jung Chen, 陳昭蓉 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | zh-TW |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Format | 55 |
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