The Relationship between Monitoring-Intensive Board and Corporate Fraud: Evidence from China Shanghai Stock Exchange / 監督型委員會與公司舞弊之關聯性—以中國上海證券交易所為例

碩士 / 國立彰化師範大學 / 財務金融技術學系 / 104 / Global economic growth and environmental changes can promote national developments but also come with corporate frauds. Therefore, independent directors play an important role in corporate governance. Based on Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, this paper examines whether company committees and independent directors have an effect on corporate frauds in China Shanghai Stock Exchange over the period 2008-2014.
This paper studies the efficiency of audit, compensation committee and independent directors’ monitoring in listed companies. The empirical results that monitoring-intensive can decrease the likelihood of corporate frauds, when a majority of independent directors serve on at least two of monitoring committees. However, in this paper also find that a negative effect but not significant relationship between audit committee and incidence of corporate fraud.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:TW/104NCUE5316030
Date January 2016
CreatorsFu,Hung-Cheng, 傅泓誠
ContributorsWu,Ming-Cheng, 吳明政
Source SetsNational Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan
Languagezh-TW
Detected LanguageEnglish
Type學位論文 ; thesis
Format49

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