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International trade and taxation: the GATT and domestic tax policy

The thesis is that to give insufficient recognition to
international trade agreements in developing tax policies can
result in distortions in international trade. It is not suggested
that the objective of facilitating free trade should be paramount
to sovereign interests which underlie tax policy decisions.
However, the proposition is that in selecting from among
alternative tax policies, the policy which should be chosen is that
which achieves national objectives while minimizing distortive
effects on international trade.
The goals of this study are: 1) to determine whether
particular tax provisions impede, distort, or otherwise have a
negative and unjustifiable effect on free trade; and 2) to reflect
on the intersecting role of taxation and international trade.
Although many tax policies may be viewed as prima facie
"discriminatory", such discrimination may be acceptable pursuant to
international agreements, or overriding national interests may
prevail. An attempt is made to develop a framework for examining
the effects of taxation on international trade which can be used as
a guide for tax policy makers in selecting policies which meet
domestic criteria as well as facilitate free trade.
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first f chapter
sets out the methodology, conceptual framework and theoretical
basis for the study. The next three chapters examine specific tax
regimes in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (the "GATT") and underlying principles of free trade. The tax regimes are: 1) withholding taxes for payments under software
licensing arrangements; 2) research and development tax incentives;
and 3) cross-border transfer pricing provisions. Chapter five
summarizes the case studies and outlines approaches to fiscal
harmonization under a free trade regime. The conclusion is that a
GATT tax code may be an appropriate mechanism for achieving
harmonization for certain tax measures. However, it is infeasible,
at least in the short term, to expect a GATT tax code will be placed on the World Trade Organization's agenda. Even if such a code is attainable in the future, unilateral, bilateral and other multi-lateral approaches to eliminating distortive tax policies may be more appropriate in some cases. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/3778
Date January 1900
CreatorsRajan, Cindy L.
Source SetsUniversity of British Columbia
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, Thesis/Dissertation
Format11893761 bytes, application/pdf
RightsFor non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.

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