The theory of deterrence has not changed much over time but the strategy of using it has. There are two types of deterrence: Deterrence by punishment and Deterrence by denial. The first is a more offensive kind of deterrence and the second a more defensive one. The Cold War set the perimeter for deterrence strategy and how it was used and has been the overall used strategy since. The same strategy however cannot be implemented in the cyber domain and therefore requires a suitable cyber deterrence strategy. This study aims to determine whether the Swedish cyber strategy is built on the components that are required for successful cyber deterrence. The study will conduct a theory consuming method to establish the components required for successful and effective cyber deterrence, and then undertake a text analysis on Swedish strategy for cybersecurity using those components. The results show that Sweden is focused mainly on the defensive side of deterrence with better systems and protocols. According to the components in the theory both offensive and defensive methods are required for deterrence to work. This may therefore explain why the Swedish cyber deterrence strategy is not as effective as it could be.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-10115 |
| Date | January 2021 |
| Creators | Hedman, Jenika |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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