State estimation plays an essential role in the monitoring and control of power transmission systems. In modern, highly inter-connected power systems the state estimation should be performed in a distributed fashion and requires information exchange between the control centers of directly connected systems. Motivated by recent reportson trojans targeting industrial control systems, in this paper we investigate how a single compromised control center can affect the outcome of distributed state estimation. We describe five attack strategies, and evaluate their impact on the IEEE 118 benchmark power system. We show that that even if the state estimation converges despite the attack, the estimate can have up to 30% of error, and bad data detection cannot locate theattack. We also show that if powerful enough, the attack can impede the convergence of the state estimation, and thus it can blind the system operators. Our results show that it is important to provide confidentiality for the measurement data in order to prevent the most powerful attacks. Finally, we discuss a possible way to detect and to mitigate these attacks. / <p>QC 20130522</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:kth-122442 |
| Date | January 2013 |
| Creators | Vuković, Ognjen, Dán, György |
| Publisher | KTH, Kommunikationsnät, KTH, Kommunikationsnät |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Conference paper, info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, p. 666-672 |
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