In Chapter 1, I provide new impossibility results for the problem of selecting
a committee of a fixed number of members out of a set of candidates in the presence of veto power. I show that even limited veto power makes many committee
selection mechanisms of interest manipulable. This applies in particular (i) to
mechanisms the range of which contains a degenerate lottery in which a committee is chosen for sure and (ii) to mechanisms that are constructed from extensive
game forms with a finite number of strategies. These impossibilities hold on a
large set of domains including the domain of additive preferences and even when
probabilistic mechanisms are allowed.
In Chapter 2, I introduce the dominance threshold, a new measure of strategic
complexity based on âlevel-kâ thinking. I use this measure to compare mechanisms used in practice to select juries in jury trials. In applying this measure,
I overturn some commonly held beliefs about which jury selection mechanisms
are strategically simple. In particular, I show that sequential mechanisms tend to
be strategically simpler than mechanisms that involve simultaneous moves: By
generating imperfect information games, simultaneous mechanisms increase the
amount of guesswork needed to determine optimal strategies.
In Chapter 3, I show that, in the context of one-to-one two-sided matching, the
deferred acceptance mechanism cannot be improved upon in terms of manipulability in the sense of Pathak and S¨onmez (2013) or Arribillaga and Mass´o (2015)
without compromising stability. I also identify conflicts between manipulability
and fairness. Stable mechanisms that minimize the set of individuals who match
with their least preferred achievable mate are shown to be maximally manipulable
among the stable mechanisms. These mechanisms are also more manipulable than
the deferred acceptance mechanism. I identify a similar conflict between fairness
and manipulability in the case of the median stable mechanisms.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:VANDERBILT/oai:VANDERBILTETD:etd-05312017-074836
Date07 June 2017
CreatorsVan der Linden, Martin Jean Christian
ContributorsJohn A. Weymark, Paul H. Edelman, Eun Jeong Heo, Myrna Wooders
PublisherVANDERBILT
Source SetsVanderbilt University Theses
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
Sourcehttp://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-05312017-074836/
Rightsunrestricted, I hereby certify that, if appropriate, I have obtained and attached hereto a written permission statement from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis, dissertation, or project report, allowing distribution as specified below. I certify that the version I submitted is the same as that approved by my advisory committee. I hereby grant to Vanderbilt University or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible, under the conditions specified below, my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation or project report. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, dissertation, or project report.

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